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ABSTRACT
DO IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS SURVIVE IN
HISTORICALLY STANDARD DOMAINS?
GU¨RER, EBRU
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
February 2008
One of the major assumptions common to all impossibility results in social
choice theory is that of ”full” or rich enough domain. Thus, a major stream
of attempts has focused on how to restrict the domains of social choice func-
tions in order to escape impossibilities, without paying much attention to the
question of whether there exist actual societies with such restricted domains
of preference profiles, however. The notion of an unrestricted domain is based
on the assumption that the individuals form their preferences independent of
each other. If one replaces this assumption by one under which individual
preferences are clustered around a ”social norm” in a unipolar standard soci-
ety, the question of how this kind of restricted domain restriction influences
the existence of a Maskin monotonic, surjective and nondictatorial social
choice function becomes important.
We employ the so-called Manhattan metric to measure the degree of how
clustered a society around a social norm is. We then try to characterize what
degrees of clustering around a social norm allow us to escape impossibility
results, in an attempt to shed some light on the question of whether impossi-
bilities in social choice theory arise from assuming the existence of historically
iii
impossible societies.
Keywords: Manhattan metric, Maskin monotonicity, dictatoriality .
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O¨ZET
TARI˙HSEL OLARAK STANDART OLAN TANIM
BO¨LGELERI˙NDE I˙MKANSIZLIK SONUC¸LARI
GEC¸ERLI˙ OLMAYI SU¨RDU¨RU¨R MU¨?
GU¨RER, Ebru
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
S¸ubat 2008
Sosyal sec¸im kuramının bu¨tu¨n imkansızlık sonuc¸larında ortak olan ana varsayımlarından
biri de, tanım bo¨lgesine ilis¸kin tam ya da yeterince zengin bo¨lge varsayımlarıdır.
Sosyal sec¸im kuramıda kars¸ılık geldikleri toplumların toplumların gerc¸ekte var
olup olmadıg¯ına dikkat edilmeksizin, imkansızlık sonuc¸larından kurtulabilmek
ic¸in, tanım bo¨lgelerini kısıtlama yolunda birc¸ok tes¸ebbu¨ste bulunulmus¸tur.
Kısıtlanmamıs¸ bir tanım bo¨lgesi du¨s¸u¨ncesi bireylerin birbirinden bag¯ımsız
olması varsayımına dayanmaktadır. Eg¯er bu varsayımı, bireylerin tercih-
lerinin tek kutuplu standart bir toplumun sosyal normu etrafında toplas¸ması
varsayımıyla deg¯is¸tirirsek, bu kısıtlamanın Maskin tekdu¨ze, o¨rten ve dikta-
torlu¨k olmayan bir sosyal sec¸im fonksiyonunun varlıg¯ına etkisi o¨nemli bir soru
haline gelir.
Bir toplumun bir sosyal norm etrafında ne kadar yog¯unlas¸mıs¸ oldug¯unu o¨lc¸mek
ic¸in Manhattan uzaklıg¯ı denilen bir metrik kullanıyoruz. Ardından bir sosyal
norm etrafında ne kadar yog¯unlas¸manın imkansızlık sonuc¸larından kurtulun-
masını sag¯layacag¯ını karakterize etmeye c¸alıs¸ıyoruz. Bu tu¨r bir c¸alıs¸manın
tarihsel olarak imkansız olan bazı toplumları varsaymanın, sosyal sec¸im ku-
v
ramındaki imkasızlıklar u¨stu¨ne ne etkide bulundug¯u sorusuna ıs¸ık tutacag¯ını
du¨s¸u¨nu¨yoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Manhattan uzaklıg¯ı, Maskin tekdu¨zelik, diktato¨rlu¨k
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We start with an alternative set A = {a1, ...an} and an individual set I =
{1, ..., N}. We form the set of complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary
relations L(A) = P on the choice set A. This forms the largest set that
individuals’ preferences can come from. But we will mostly be working with
particular restricted domains D ⊂ P in this study. Restricted domains are
frequently employed notion in social choice theory in an attempt to avoid
impossibility results which hold on sufficiently rich domains. In our study we
also consider particular domain restrictions to see their impact upon impos-
sibility results. The kind of restrictions that we deal with here are, however,
based on entirely different reasons than those that have been introduced in
the literature so far.
In history, it has been “common opinions of the public” upon which the
stability of a society is based. The rules governing a society evolve in time to
meet certain basic societal requirements. Unless there is some kind of “com-
mon approval” or “common belief” on the basics, however, it is difficult to
imagine what will make a society to last. Thus, we expect that individual
preferences cluster around “social norms” in at least some important social
choice problems. In this study, we focus on social choice problems, where
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there is a social norm and examine how close individual preferences should
be clustered around it to turn impossibilities to possibilities.
First we fix an ordering Ps on A which is meant to reflect a social norm.
We then use the Manhattan metric to measure the distance of an individ-
ual preference to Ps. We thus obtain a classification of the orderings in P
according to their distances to P. The subdomain that we denote Dk with
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n(n− 1)/2}, consists of elements from P whose distances to Ps
are less than or equal to k. The elements in D1, for example, are the orderings
with distance 1 to Ps and Ps itself.
The distance of a preference ordering to the “standard social ordering Ps”
in terms of the Manhattan metric is the minimal number of elementary steps
needed to transform that preference into Ps. An elementary step is changing
the order of two consecutively ranked alternatives, keeping the rest of the or-
dering unchanged. It is easy to see that the maximal distance of an ordering
to Ps is n(n − 1)/2, and it is attained when the ordering ?? starts with is
the reversal of Ps if |A| = n. The bottom ranked alternative goes to the top
in n− 1 steps. Now the new bottom ranked alternative requires n− 2 steps
to reach the second rank. Continuing similarly, the initial ordering will be
reversed in (n− 1) + ...+ 2 + 1 = n(n− 1)/2 steps.
We will focus on Mueller-Satterthwaite Theorem (1977) as a representa-
tive of impossibility theorems in this study. That is we will be examining the
existence of social choice functions satisfying Maskin monotonicity, surjectiv-
ity and non-dictatoriality on our domains, Dk(k = 0, 1, ...,
n(n−1)
2
) under the
presence of at least three alternatives. Our first result is that there does not
exist any Maskin monotonic and surjective SCF onDk with k ≤ n−2 for n ≥ 3
alternatives. As D0 consists of one profile only, there is no surjective SCF
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on D0. When k ∈ {1, ..., n− 2}, the impossibility arises because the bottom
alternative which has to be chosen at some profile never gets top ranked by
any of the individuals. Then we give an example of a Maskin monotonic, sur-
jective and nondictatorial SCF on Dn−1. This also shows that Dn−1 domain
is the minimal domain allowing the existence of an SCF with the required
properties. For the remaining domains Dk with k ∈ {n, ..., n(n − 1)/2}, we
prove the impossibility of a Maskin monotonic, surjective and nondictatorial
SCF on Dk.
In our study, we use the notion of a linked domain Aswal et al. (2002)
extensively. The notion of a linked domain is based on the notion of con-
nected pairs of alternatives, which is being utilized in the proof of our main
theorem concerning the impossibility on Dn.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We introduce basic notions
in Chapter 2 and our main results in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
Let A = {a1, a2, ..., an} be an alternative set, and I = {1, ..., N} a set of
individuals. Let P stand for the class of linear orderings on A. Any P ∈ PN
is referred to as a preference profile.A preference profile P includes preferences
of all individuals’. In particular Pi shows the ordering of individual i ∈ I,
with the usual understanding that ajPiak denotes aj is preferred to ak by
individual i. We denote rk(Pi) for the k
th ranked alternative in Pi for any
k ∈ {1, ..., n}. As usual, (P ′i , P−i) is used to show the preference profile
obtained from P by replacing Pi in P by P
′
i .
Definition. For any linear ordering P1 ∈ P, we will refer to the operation of
interchanging the positions of two alternatives with consecutive ranks in P1
to obtain another linear ordering as an elementary operation applied to P1.
Definition. For any P1,P2 ∈ P the Manhattan distance m(P1, P2) between
P1 and P2 is defined to be the minimal number of elementary operations
needed to obtain P2 from P1.
4
Example 1. For A = {a, b, c, d} let us fix an ordering Ps ∈ P, where
Ps =
a
b
c
d
with the usual understanding that r1(Ps) = a, ..., r4(Ps) = d. It is easy to see
that MaxPi∈P m(Ps, Pi) =
4.3
2
= 6 and is attained at
P
′
s =
d
c
b
a
In general, when |A| = n, this maximal distance according to theManhattanmetric
again occurs between a given ordering Ps and its reversal Ps
′
, and it is equal
to n.(n−1)
2
. To see this, note that one needs n − 1 elementary operations for
the bottom alternative in Ps to reach the top rank. Now the bottom alterna-
tive needs to go to the second rank, requiring n − 2 elementary operations.
Continuing in a similar fashion until we reach Ps
′
, the minimal total number
of steps need is seen to be (n− 1) + (n− 2) + ...+ 1 = n(n−1)
2
.
For any nonempty subset D of F f : DN → A is called a social choice
function (SCF).
We will now imagine that a particular ordering Ps ∈ P represents a social
norm around which our society I clusters regarding its members’ preferences
on A. We will use the maximal Manhattan distance of individual preferences
to the social norm Ps in a society as a measure of the degree of clustering
around Ps. Formally, for any Ps ∈ P and any k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n(n−1)2 } we define
Dk(Ps) = {Pi ∈ P : m(Pi, Ps) 6 k}. Note that D0(Ps) = {Ps}, while
5
Dn(n−1)
2
(Ps) = P
Definition. An SCF f is said to be unanimous if f(P ) = aj whenever
r1(Pi) = aj for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
Let L(x, Pi) = {y ∈ A : xPiy} denote the lower counter of x relative to
Pi.
Definition. (Maskin monotonicity)An SCF f : DN → A is called Maskin
monotonic if for any x ∈ A, any i ∈ I, any P ∈ DN and any Pi′ ∈ D
f(P ) = x [L(x, Pi) ⊂ L(x, P ′i)] ⇒ f(Pi′ , P−i) = x
Definition. An SCF f : DN → A is called dictatorial if there exists an
individual i ∈ I such that for all P ∈ DN , f(P ) = r1(Pi).
Definition. A domain D ⊂ P is said to be minimally rich if, for all a ∈ A,
there exists Pi ∈ D such that r1(Pi) = a.
Definition. A pair of alternatives aj and ak are said to be connected in
D, denoted by aj ∼ ak, if there exist Pi, Pm ∈ D such that r1(Pi) = aj ,
r2(Pi) = ak, r1(Pm) = ak, r2(Pm) = aj.
The relation ∼ is symmetric, i.e. aj ∼ ak implies ak ∼ aj.
Definition. A domain D is called linked if there exists a one to one function
σ : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n} such that
(i)aσ(1) ∼ aσ(2)
(ii)aσ(j) is linked to {aσ(1), aσ(2), . . . aσ(j−1)} for j = 3, . . . , n.
Definition. An alternative a ∈ A is linked to a set {b1, b2, . . . bj} ⊂ A if
there exist two distinct elements c, d ∈ {b1, b2, . . . , bj} such that a ∼ c and
a ∼ d
Definition. A domain has D ⊂ Pis said to have unique seconds property
if there exist x, y ∈ A such that for all Pi ∈ D with r1(Pi) = x, one has
r2(Pi) = y.
6
The following example is an illustration of minimal richness and the unique
seconds property.
Example 2. Let A = {a, b, d, c} be the alternative set and
Ps =
a
b
c
d
be the standard ordering. Below are the orderings grouped according to their
distance to the standard ordering.
a
b
c
d︸︷︷︸
of distance 0
b
a
c
d
a
c
b
d
a
b
d
c︸ ︷︷ ︸
of distance 1
b
c
a
d
b
a
d
c
c
a
b
d
a
c
d
b
a
d
b
c︸ ︷︷ ︸
of distance 2
c d a b b c
b a d c d a
a b c d a d
d c b a c b︸ ︷︷ ︸
of distance 3
c
b
d
a
c
d
a
b
b
d
c
a
d
b
a
c
d
a
c
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
of distance
d
c
a
b
d
b
c
a
c
d
b
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
of distance 5
d
c
b
a︸︷︷︸
of distance 6
Note that D3(Ps) is minimally rich and has the unique seconds property
property with x = d and y = a. D6(Ps) is the entire domain. Now forth, we
will write Dk instead of Dk(Ps) to simplify notation.
7
CHAPTER 3
MAIN RESULTS
In this chapter we will keep a particular ordering Ps ∈ P fixed to represent a
norm ordering on A. We will write simply Dk for Dk(Ps).
Theorem 1. Let A be an alternative set with n elements and I is the individ-
ual set with N members. For k ∈ {1, ..., n− 2}, if f : DkN → A is surjective,
then f is not Maskin monotonic.
Proof. First observe that for k ∈ {1, ..., n − 2}, Dk is not minimally rich,
since we need n − 1 steps for the bottom alternative in the norm ordering
Ps to reach the top. Now assume that f is surjective. Suppose also that
f is Maskin monotonic. Then there exists a preference profile P such that
f(P ) = r1(Ps) = a. Let Pi
′ ∈ Dk be the linear ordering in Dk where a has the
highest possible rank, i.e. a = rn−k(Pi
′
). Let P˜ ∈ DkN be such that P˜j = Pi′
for each j ∈ I. By monotonicity f(P˜ ) = a. Now since f is surjective there
is also a preference profile P
′′ ∈ DkN that is mapped to the top alternative
of Ps, say r1(Ps) = b. Now P˜ is such that r1(P˜j) = b for all j ∈ I, so that
f(P˜ ) = b as well by monotonicity. So this contradiction implies that f i not
Maskin monotonic.
Lemma 1. For |A| = n, Dk has the unique seconds property and is minimally
rich with k ∈ {1, 2, ...n(n−1)
2
} iff it is k = n− 1.
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Proof. Obviously for all a ∈ A there exists Pi ∈ Dn−1 such that r1(Pi) = a
which simply means that Dn−1 is minimally rich. Furthermore, when the
bottom alternative of Ps goes to the top the only alternative can come after
that in Dn−1, is the top alternative of Ps, so that the domain has the unique
seconds property with the bottom alternative of Ps as x and the top alterna-
tive of Ps as y in the definition. Now for the proof of the only if part, we know
that we need at least n − 1 steps for the bottom alternative to the top. So,
minimal richness implies that k ∈ {n−1, ..., n(n−1)
2
}. However, it is clear that
Dn−1 is the only one having unique seconds property among these domains.
Lemma 2. Let D be a minimally rich domain with the unique seconds prop-
erty. Then for any N ≥ 2 there exists a non-dictatorial, surjective, Maskin
monotonic SCF f : DN → A.
Proof. As D has the unique seconds property there exist a, b ∈ A.Define
f : DN → A by such that r2(Pi) = b whenever Pi ∈ D with r1(Pi) = a.
f(P1, P2, ..., Pn) =
 r1(P1) if ; r1(P1) 6= ax if ; r1(P1) = a
where xP2y with {x, y} = {a, b}
Clearly f is non-dictatorial and surjective. We claim that it is Maskin mono-
tonic.
Case1: Let f(P1 × P2) = γ where γ 6= a or b then r1(P1) = γ. Assume
P˜1 × R˜2 be an γ-improvement of P1 × P2. Clearly f(P˜1 × P˜2) = γ since γ-
improvement of P1 will continue to start with γ.
Case 2: Now let f(P1 × P2) = b, so either r1(P1) = b or r1(P1) = a and
bR2a. For the first case we know that for any b-improvement of P1, P˜1 and
any b-improvement of P2, P˜2 we will have f(P˜1 × P˜12) = b. For the second
case we can observe that for b-improvement of P2 always bP2a, for P1 we
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have that r1(P1) = a and r2(P1) = b from unique seconds property. So either
r1(P˜1) = a, r2(P˜1) = b or r1(P˜1) = b where P˜1 is b-improvement of P1. In
both cases we can see that b continues to be chosen.
Case 3: Now assume f(P1 × P2) = a. There is only one state to realize this
case. It is r1(P1) = a and aP2b. For any a-improvement P˜1 of P1, r1(P˜1) = a
and since aP˜2b, P˜2 a-improvement of P2, a will continue to be chosen.
Theorem 2. Let f : Dn
N → A be a Maskin monotone and onto SCF, then f
is dictatorial.
Proof. In the proof of the this theorem we assume that A = {a, b, c, ...} and
standard ordering is
a
b
c
...
We argue by induction on N . For N=1 we know that the theorem is
correct. Since there is only one person, he must be the dictator. Then we
assume that the theorem is correct for N = K and we will prove it for
N = K + 1.
Let F : Dn
K+1 → A be a Maskin monotone and onto SCF. We define f :
Dn
K → A by f(P1, ..., PK)=F (P1, ..., PK , PK). Now we observe that f is onto.
Since F is onto and F is Maskin monotone then it is Maskin monotone and
unanimous. For each alternative x ∈ A we can move x to the top position,
by unanimity all x ∈ A can be chosen. f is also Maskin monotone. Because
∀x ∈ A such that f(P1, ..., PN) = x, consider that Q1, ..., QK are elementary
improvements of x. Now since F (Q1, ..., QK , QK)= f(Q1, ..., QK)=x, f must
be Maskin monotone. By our induction assumption f is dictatorial.
Assume that 1st person of f is dictator. This implies that 1st person of F is
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dictator. Given x ∈ A
f(
x,
..., · · · , ...
... x
. . . x
) = x = F (
x,
..., · · · , ..., ...
... x
. . . x x
)
Here above we assume that PN and PN+1 are same. Even if we allow PN and
PN+1 to be distinct, we have
F (
x,
..., · · · , ..., ...
... x
. . . x x
) = x
So we prove that 1st person of F is dictator.
Similarly if our case is that 2nd, 3rd, ..., N − 1st person is dictator of f , cor-
responding person of F is dictator. Now assume that N th person of f is
dictator. This implies that,
f(P1, ..., PN) = r1(PN) = F (P1, ..., PN , PN).
That is, if N th and N + 1th preferences are same then we are done. However
they do not have to be same.
Consider if r1(PN) = r1(PN+1) then F (P1, ..., PN , PN+1) = r1(PN). Because
F (
. . . . . x x
...
...
. . .
...
...
) = x
If we change one of the PN and PN+1 such that x is still at the top, then it
will be an x improvement. So F still gives x. So we have shown that N th and
N + 1th are joint dictators in the sense that if their first preferences are same
then F gives it.
Now define Sa,b,c = {P ∈ Dn : r1(P ), r2(P ) ∈ {a, b, c}}
We claim that F |SN+1a,b,c has image exactly {a, b, c} It is clear that F |SN+1a,b,c has
image ⊇ {a, b, c} because of unanimity. Assume that F (P1, ..., PN+1) = w
where Pi ∈ Sa,b,c for i = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 but w /∈ {a, b, c}.
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So we have that
F (P1, ..., PN−1,
x α
y β
...
...
w w
...
...
) = w
such that x, y, α, β ∈ {a, b, c} but w /∈ {a, b, c}. This means that
F (P1, ..., PN−1,
x α
y β
w w
...
...
) = w
because
x α
y β
w w
...
...
are respectively w-improvement of
x α
y β
...
...
w w
...
...
)
Remark: Here we allow n distance, so after
a b a c b c
b a c a c b
...
...
...
...
...
...
any other element of A can follow
But at least two of the top alternatives are same. So we can put them to
the top. This gives a contradiction to joint dictatoriality of N th and N + 1th
people. Thus F |SN+1a,b,c has image {a, b, c}.
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Now let
S = {
a b a c b c
b a c a c b
...,
...,
...,
...,
...,
...
c c b b a a
}
Let g : L({a, b, c})N+1 → {a, b, c} be the corresponding function. That is, for
example
g(
a c
b, b,
c a
. . . ,
b
a
c
) = F (
a c
b, b,
...
...
c a
, . . . ,
b
a
...
c
)
It is not difficult to see that g is Maskin monotone and onto. Since it is defined
from a full domain by Mueller-Satterthwaite Theorem it must be dictatorial.
We also have the following for all a, b, c.
g(
a
b,
c
. . . ,
a c c
b, a, a
c b b
) = F (
a
b,
...
c
. . . ,
a c c
b, a, a
...
...
...
c b b
) = c
So either N th or N + 1th people of g is dictator. Without loss of generality
we will assume that N th person is the dictator. Now note that
g(
b
c,
a
. . . ,
b a b
c, b, c
a c a
) = F (
b
c,
...
a
. . . ,
b a b
c, b, c
...
...
...
a c a
) = a
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That is F (
...,
a
. . . ,
..., a,
...
a
... a
) = a
By Maskin monotonicity, whenever Kth person wants a first, F gives a. Simi-
lar argument is valid for b and c. So we have thatKth person is a, b, c dictator.
(i.e if Kth person wants a, b or c first F gives it).
Fix w ∈ A such that w /∈ {a, b, c}. We define Sa,b,w = {P ∈ Dn : r1(P ), r2(P ) ∈
{a, b, w}}. We claim that F |{a,b,w} has image {a, b, w}. If not ∃ z /∈ {a, b, w}
such that
F (P1, . . . , PK−1,
x α
y β
...
...
z z
...
...
) = z, where x, y, α, β ∈ {a, b, w}.
Clearly x 6= a, x 6= b, because N th person is a, b-dictator. So x = w and
y = a or y = b. Hence F |Sa,b,wK+1 has image {a, b, w}. Now construct a set S
with the following property:
S = (
a
b,
...
w
b a w b w
a w a w b
...
...
...
...
...
)
The first element always exists in Dn. Similarly define h : L({a, b, w})K+1 →
{a, b, w} via the correspondence of F |SN+1 . Again h is Maskin monotone and
onto. So h is dictatorial. Moreover the following equation says that N th
14
person of h must be dictator:
h(
b b
w, w,
a a
. . . ,
b a b
w, b, w
a w a
) = F (
b b
w, w,
...
...
. . . ,
b a b
w b w
...
...
...
) = a.
In particular
h(
a
b,
w
. . . ,
a w a
b, a, b
w b w
) = w ⇒ F (
...
w
, . . . ,
..., w,
...
w
... w
) = w.
Now even when we allow different preferences, as long as Kth person chooses
w first, then F gives w. Since w is arbitrary Kth person is a dictator. So F
is dictatorial.
Definition. Assume A has n elements. Let D be a domain. D is said to be
top− bottom rich if ∀a ∈ A, ∃P,Q ∈ D such that r1(P ) = a and rn(Q) = a.
Theorem 3. Let D be a top-bottom rich domain. Let D ⊂ K.
[f : DN → A Maskin monotone and onto → f dictatorial] ⇒ [f : KN →
A Maskin monotone and onto→ f dictatorial]
Proof. Let F : KN → A be a Maskin monotone and onto SCF. Then F |DN
is still Maskin monotone and onto. Wlog let 1st person of F |DN be the
dictator. Then given x ∈ A let P,Q ∈ D such that r1(P ) = rn(Q) = x.
Since F (P,Q, ..., Q) = x even when we allow different choices, all will be
x − improvements of the previous profile. Since x was arbitrary 1st person
of F is dictator. So F is dictatorial.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
In case a historically standard society is deemed as one where individual ref-
erences cluster to some degree around a standard social ordering”, we have
covered all degrees of such clustering concerning the existence of a surjec-
tive, Maskin monotonic, non-dictatorial SCF in the presence of at least three
alternatives. Our work partitions the collection of Dk, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n(n−1)2 }
into three subsets. The domains Dk turn out to be sufficiently rich for the
impossibility result to survive when k ∈ {n, ..., n(n−1)
2
} or the domains Dk
with k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 2}, we again have an impossibility result, but this time
since Dk is not rich enough rather than sufficiently rich. In this range, the
domain is too poor to allow every alternative to be top ranked at least once.
This turns surjectivity to an overdemanding condition when conjoined with
Maskin monotonicity. The most interesting case seems to be Dn−1, where
the forces exerted by surjectivity and Maskin monotonicity seem to be “bal-
anced,” in the sense that they allow the existence of a nondictatorial SCF on
Dn−1.
The construction of our domains Dk in the present study are based on a
“unipolar society,”. One may naturally also think of “bipolar societies,” even
though these may not be as standard as unipolar ones and may not last long.
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Our present study leads to conjectures about bipolar societies that parallel
the results obtained here. We imagine now two orderings which are reversal
of each other to reflect opposite “social norms,” around which two different
parts of the society cluster. We conjecture that, in such a society split into
two, it will be the sum of the allowed distances from the two opposite norm
orderings that will be decisive concerning whether we will end up with possi-
bility or impossibility results. In fact, we believe a similar taxonomy as as the
one in the present study will be obtained if one replaces the allowed distance
from the norm ordering here by the sum of the allowed distances from the
two opposite norm orderings in a bipolar society.
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